
S' 1S00 M 



Glass _^ 



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SPEECH 



o'6 V 



MB. ROBERTSOl^, OF VIRGINIA, i^^f 



ON HIS MOTION TO 



RECOMMIT THE REPORT AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE 
SELECT COMMITTEE 



«f TBI 



SUBJBOT OF ABOIilTlOM 



SKUVERID I» T«» 



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Mat, 188«. 



WASHINGTON CITY: 

PRINTED BY DUFF GREEN. 

1836. 



N 6' 3 7 ^». 



SPEECH. 



Mr. PiNCKNEY, on leave, presented a report from the Select Committee 
on the subject of the abolition of slavery. In making this report, Mr. P. 
remarked that it had received the unanimous assent of the committee, and 
he trusted it would meet the unanimous approbation of the House. By the 
instruction of the committee, he moved that it be read and printed. 

Mr. Mercer moved that the report be laid on the table without reading, 
and printed. 

Mr. Claiborne, of Mississippi, asked for the reading of the report, which 
was accordingly done. 

The reading occupied about an hour and a half. The report concluded 
with the following resolutions: 

Resolved^ That Congress possesses no constitutional authority to interfere 
in any way with the institution ©f slavery in any of the States of this 
confederacy. 

Resolved, That Congress ought not to interfere in any way with the 
slavery in the District of Columbia. 

And whereas it is extremely important and desirable that the agitation of 
this subject should be finally arrested for the purpose of restoring tranquillity 
to the public mind, your committee respectfully recommend the adoption 
of the following additional resolution, viz: 

Resolved, That all petitions, memorials, resolutions, propositions, or 
papers, relating in any way, or to any extent whatsoever, to the subject of 
slavery, or the abolition of slavery, shall, without being either printed or 
referred, be laid upon the table, and that no further action whatever shall be 
had thereon. 

Mr. PiNCKNEir was instructed to move that 5,000 extra copies of the re- 
port be printed. 

This motion gave rise to a desultory debate. 

Mr. Robertson expressed himself greatly diBsalisfied with tho report 
and resolutions. 



It might be true, he remarked, as the gentleman from N. Carohna (Mr. 
Speight) had said, that they maintained every ground which the South had 
contended for, except o?ie— but that exception embraced every thing worth 
contending for— /Ae unconstitulionality of the measures proposed by the 
abolitionists. In waiving that, the committee had surrendered the only 
gronnd upon which the rights or the peace of the South could ever scarcely 
repose. - . 

He objected to the printing of an extra number, or any number oi ine 
report and resolutions; intending, he said, to submit a motion which, it it 
should prevail, would supersede the necessity of printing them, at least m 
their present form. After a few other observations, Mr. R. concluded by 
moving to re commit the report and resolutions to the Select Commiltee^ 
with instructions to report the following resolution: 

Resolved, That Compress has no constitutional power to abolish slavery 
in the District of Columbia^ or in the Territories of the United States. 

Thursday, Mat 19th. 

After Mr. Btnum and Mr. Pinckney had addressed the House, 

Mr. Robertson rose in reply to those gentlemen, and in support of his 

motion. . , , • • «• ^r 

He said, he ought perhaps to feel much honored by the special notice oi 
go distinguished a leader of the great democratic party, as the gentleman 
from N.Carolina, (Mr.BYNUM.) That gentleman, Mr.Speaker, seems greatly 
at a loss to comprehend my reasons for submitting the resolution now under 
consideration, which in his opinion, it seeme, is fraught with danger to the 
Union. Sir, I am not to be deterred from defending the rights and interests 
of my constituents, by groundless charges or apprehensions of danger to the 
Union. The Union is always in danger, in the estimation of the dominant 
party, from all who dare to resist its schemes or measures. Similar efforts 
were made by the federalists when in power to bring suspicion and odium 
upon the old republican party, by ascribing their opposition to French in- 
fluence, and enmity to the Union. But, sir, I rise with no view of replying 
lo remarks of this character; nor with the vain expectation of satislying the 
gentleman from N. Carolina. My object is to endeavor to vindicate the 
resolution upon your table, lo the satisfaction of this House, and more espe- 
cially of those who sent me here, and who have a right to know the reasons 
which influence my public conduct. 

I must confess, sir, that to me it seems not a little strange, that objections 
should be 60 vehemently urged to this resolution by the gentleman from N. 
Carolina, and the chairman of the Select Committee. They both admit 
the justice of the principle it asserts, and are prepared, as they tell us, to 
sustain it by their votes; yet they are both un.villing that a direct vote 
should be had upon it, and resist every effort to bring it before the^ House. 
They denounce a measure they themselves proclaim to be just. Surel> it 
ought to be a sufficient answer to these gentlemen to say, I urge it, on the 
contrary, because it is just, and asserts, as they themselves concede, thecon- 
Bfitutional rights of the people. 

But though this reason ought to be sufficient, there is an additional con- 
•idepation, Mr. Speaker, by which I am influenced, the force of which none 



can deny. With me, It carries the weight of the mo3t direct and positive 
instructions. I allude to the sentiments expressed throughout the ^vhole 
Southern country, and more especially by my own State, in regard to the ; 
very question involved in the resolution. I set up no pretensions, sir, to be^ 
the exclusive representative of the South; but I may at least be allowed' 
to understand something of the views and feelings of my native State. 
Are gentlemen aware that a resolution, denying the power of Congress t(y< 
interfere with slavery, in the precise terms of the resolution on your table, 
was adopted by the General Assembly of Virginia during iis late session, 
by an almost unanimous vote, and transmitted to each of iier representatives 
on this floor? In taking the course, then, so much dispproved by these" 
gentlemen, I do but speak the voice of my constituents— of the entire State 
indeed, which I have in part the honor to represent; and maintain their rights 
upon the very ground they themselves have placed it. Knowing their wishes, 
and satisfied with the justice of their cause, I could not shrink from main- 
taining it, to the best of my ability, without being a recreant to my trust. 
Are gentlemen answered ? i > • u 

But we are told, if we press this question we must inevitably lose it; that 
there is an overwhelming majority against us. How have gentlemen ascer- 
tained the fact asserted with so much confidence ? What vote has ever yet 
been taken from which the sense of the House could be known ? 

Mr. PiscKNEY explained: he did not say that he knew of his own know- 
ledge that the resolution would be negatived. He merely apprehended that 
such would be the case. As the matter now stood, Congress was uncom-, 
mitted on the subject. 

Mr. Robertson. Sir, I am opposed to all noncommittals upon so vital a 
question. I desire to see a direct vote upon it. It is necessary that the 
people should know the extent of their danger, that means may betaken iii 
time to provide against it. 

The gentleman from South Carolina informs us, that there are 34,000 
names subscribed to the abolition memorials. Of these about 15,000 are 
the names of females; the residue, nineteen or twenty thousand, of males; 
all of whom, perhaps, are entitled to the right of suffrage. These constitute 
the van-guard-, the bold, the daring, the reckless of the abolitionists. There 
are doubtless many more; double, triple, perhaps quadruple the number, who 
secretly wish well to the cause. It is impossible to measure the power and 
influence of this formidable band. I repeat that they have obtained all that 
they could rationally have anticipated ; and even more. They must have 
known that they could not, at this session, procure the passage of a law abol- 
ishing slavery: it is not the proper time to press it. But they have succeeded 
in getting up agitation, from one extremity of the Union to the other ; and 
this report, in waiving the question of constitutional power, upon the ground 
now avowed, that a majority of Congress is prepared to assert it, is calculated 
to inspire them with fresh hopes, and to increase, rather than to allay, the 
apprehensions of the South. It is not to be expected liiat the abolitionists, 
under these circumstances, will desist from their nefarious schemes. 1 am 
unwilling therefore to give up the only barrier which can effectually protect 
us, without a struggle to defend it. I will not believe that Congress ih 
disposed to wrest that barrier from us, or to deny us its protection- tJut il 
such be the fact, let us know it, that by an amendment of the cousUtution 



we may put an end to a pretension so incompatible with our safety. It ig 
for this reason, sir,I wish the question niret and decided, by a direct and un- 
equivocal vote. I desire to see the rights of the Southern people rested, 
Bot on the fluctuating and capricious notions of moral obligation, or tire 
shifting ground of political expediency, but on the firm basis of the consti- 
tution: on fixed ])rinciples: on principles which all may appeal to, and which 
are the same to-day, to-morrow, and for ever. 

[The morning hour having expired, the House proceeded to the orders of 
the day.] 

Saturday, Mat 21. 

• Mr. Robertson, who was entitled to the floor, again addressed the House. 

•I avail myself of the permission of tiie Chair, (said Mr. R.) to enter in- 
to a fuller exposition and vindication of the resolution I had the honor to 
submit a few days past, than I then had an opportunity of doing. This is 
due to myself; to those who sent me here; but above all, to the solemn im- 
portance of the question, and the vast magnitude of the interests it involves. 
1 shall endeavor, sir, to perform this task, for which, however I am con- 
scious of possessing no adequate powers, either physical or mental, as calmly 
and dispassionately as the nature of the subject will permit; and to abstain, 
if possible, from those exciting topics, by which its discussion has been al- 
njDst invariably characterized. 

I have already assigned some reasons for dissatisfaction with the report of 
the Select Committee, and for the opinion expressed, that it would be con- 
sidered as virtually surrendering the constitutional question. If it could 
have been met satisfactorily to the South, no sufficient excuse can be offered 
for waiving it; and all will believe it was avoided, because of the difficulty 
of making good the position for which wc contend. The cliairman tells us, 
asan apology for taking this course, that the committee abstained from ex- 
amining it, '< because they ivere not insttmcied iu discuss it.'' Sir, the in- 
structions, so far from prohibiting this discussion, plainly authorized and re- 
quired it. They enjoined it upon the committee, to report that '' in the 
opinion of this House, Congress ought not to interfere, in any way, with 
slavery in the District of Columbia, because it would be a violation of the 
public faith, unwise, impolitic, and dangerous to the Union; assigning ,v?/c/» 
reasons for these conclusions, as in the judgment of the committee, may be 
best calculated to enlighten the ■public mind, to ullay excitement., to re- 
press agitation, to secure and maintain the jusl rights of the slavehold- 
ing States, and of the people of this District, and to restore liarviony and 
tranrjuiUity among the various sections of this Union.'' Thus it appears, 
that full latitude was allowed the committee in supporting the conclusions 
which the House desired to see maintained; and what stronger reason 
could tlicy have assigned, than tlut the proj)Osed interference with slavery 
in this District, would he a direct infraction of the constitution? This reason 
alone would have been suflicienf . It embraced all the positions the House 
htJd taken; for if the measure ' t»ald be shown lo bo unconstitutional, it must, 
of necessity — be a breach of faith, unioise, impolilic, and dangerous. Sii-, 
the committee were not justified in omitting to interpose this constitutional 
barrier, in defence of the rijjhts they were instructed to mninlain. 



Independently of his instructions, the chairman of the committee, espe- 
cially, stood bound to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the proposed in- 
terference. In a letter to which his name is affixed, addressed to the elec- 
tors of the Charleston electoral district, (South Carolina,) he uses this 
language: 

*' And now I ask my fellow citizens seriously to consider, and candidly 
to decide, whether, as I have already succeeded in obtaining a solemn declara- 
tion by Congress that ' any interference with slavery in the District of Colum- 
bia, would be a violation of the public faith,' if I should also succeed in 
procuring the adoption of a report, insisting and demonstrating that a viola- 
tion of the public faith is unconstitutional, and that therefore^ and up- 
on that ground. Congress will not, and ought not to interfere in any way 
with slavery in the District of Columbia; whether doing this, I really de- 
serve to be stigmatzed as a traitor to the South." 

Sir, I will apply no such epithet to the chairman of the committee, 
whether he succeed or fail. But is he likely to realize the expectations he 
has raised? Does not the report declare that the committee have abstained 
even from the- examination of the constitutional question? It is true, that 
in another part of the report, the ground indicated in this letter is approached. 
Even there, however, it is not directly occupied. It is not alleged, nor 
demonstrated, that a breach of faith is unconstitutional; but that, to prove 
the act in question a breach of faith, is tantamount , in its binding obligation, 
to a positive declaration that it would be so. The moral obligation does not 
necessarily import a constitutional obligation, but is something of eqaiva- 
lent force. Not satisfied, however, with this position,the report goes on to 
insist, that the moral obligation is even more efficacious. 

" What is the meaning of the declaration adopted by the House, in rela- 
tion to the District of Columbia? Is it not that Congress cannot and will 
not do an act which it has solemnly proclaimed to involve a violation of the 
public faith? Does it not afiford every security to the South which it is in 
the power of the Federal Government to afford? Is it not tantamount in 
its binding obligation upon the Government to a positive declaration, that 
the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia would be unconstitu- 
tional? Nay, is it not even more efficacious in point of fact? Constitutional 
provisions are matters of construction. The opinion of one House upon an 
abstract controverted point, may be overruled and reversed by another. 
But when Congress has once declared that a particular act would be a 
violation of the public faith, is it to be supposed that it would ever violate 
a pledge thus given to the country?" 

The whole stress of the argument is to prove, not that to violate the pledge 
would violate the constitution, as the letter proposes, but that such a pledge 
gives a security equal, or even superior, to the constitution itself. But does 
not every man see that this argument is unsound and fallacious? I confess 
I was surprised to hear it addressed at this time of day, to the representatives 
of the American people; by a gentleman, too, coming from the South. 

What folly was it in our ancestors, if this be so, to spend days and months 
in anxious deliberation, framing written constitutions for each of the States, 
and for the Union, containing guarded limitations against abuses of power? 
Why did they not discover the superior efficacy of this moral obligation, 
which prohibits every act that violates good faith between man and man, 



8 

and reposes the rights of their countrymen, upon th« good faith, the good 
sense, and the justice of those who are to administer their Government? 
If, 33 the report declares, a succeeding Congress may reverse the opinion of 
a prior one, in reference to the construction of a written constitution, may 
they not also controvert an opinion in respect to the existence or efficacy of 
a moral obligation? Must there not exist even greater contrariety of opinion^ 
upon questions of moral propriety, than of legal construction? 

Sir, if the chairman of the committee could have placed the rights of the 
District upon the ground of the constitution, he has neglected to place them 
upon the strongest of all positions; upon the only ground on which they can 
long or successfully be defended. I cannot agree, that notions of moral 
obligation merely, are higher security than the positive injunctions of our 
fundamental law. As our sole dependance, they are not worth a rush. Give 
us the constitution as our defence; we want no higher security. We had a 
right to expect this from him. It has been affirmed on this floor, by one of my 
colleagues, (Mr. Wise,) that the chairman gave an explicit pledge, that the 
question sliould be placed upon that ground. I have heard no denial of this 
statement. But the gentleman, I observe, is not now in his seat, and I forbear, 
therefore, to make any further remark upon that subject. Perhaps he will in- 
sist that he has redeemed his promise; that he has convinced, or will convince 
the House, that every breach of good faith is a violation of the constitution. 
I fear he will find himself mistaken; but if not — if he shall succeed in pro- 
ducing this conviction — then the House, I trust, as well as himself, will con- 
cur in supporting the resolution now under consideration. If the majority 
«hall be of opinion that the measure is unconstitutional, and will unite in 
saying so, it is immaterial by what course of reasoning each may arrive at 
that conclusion. Let us declare the opinion that it is a violation of the 
constitution, and each reconcile his vote to his constituents, or his own 
conscience, upon whatever grounds his judgment may best approve. It is 
to the constitution, Mr. Speaker, that those \vhom I have the honor to repre- 
sent, nay, sir, the entire State itself from which I come, acting through her 
immediate representatives, has appealed for protection. 

I have already adverted, Mr. Speaker, to the resolution on this subject, 
adopted at the last session of the General Assembly of Virginia, of which 
the instruction I have moved is an exact copy. That resolution was adopted 
in the House of Delegates, by a vote of 106 to 13. It was offered, permit 
me to say, not by one of those whose patriotism might be questioned, on 
the ground of opposition to the ruling powers, but by one of the orthodox 
faitli — by a staunch friend of the administration. The administration naa- 
jority in that House almost unanimously — perhaps without an exception — 
sustained it. Nor does Virginia alone assume this position; tlie Legisla- 
tures of Georgia^ Mississippi, and Louisiana, if I have not been misin- 
formed, have adopted similar resolutions; one of them perhaps going still 
farther, and threatening to secede from the Union, if any measure should be 
adopted endangering the security of the slaveholding States. I do not ad- 
vert to these threats as approving them: they ought, perhaps, never to be 
made. It will be time enough to talk of secession when the crisis shall arrive, 
if it ever should, when no other alternative is left us, but to sever the Union, 
or lurrender the rights it was intended to protect. But such language shows, 
what ought to be known, the danger to result from countenancing, in any- 
way, the schemes of the abolitionists. 



,The States of South Carolina and Alabama, also, it is said, have de- 
uoimced tlie measure in question as an usurpation. This is precisely 
equivalent, all will admit, to a declaration that it is unconstitutional. 

Thus 9ix Southern States have concurred in pronouncing the contempla- 
ted interference an infraction of the constitution. With this fact before us, 
who shall condemn their Representatives, believing that ground to be just, for 
maintaining it on this floor. 

But, say gentlemen, where is the policy of assuming this position? There 
is an overwhelming majority against you? The gentleman from South 
Carolina, (Mr. Pinckney) asks, why occupy this ground with a moral cer- 
tainty of being driven from it? Sir, the same rules that should govern us 
in onr- private transactions, should govern us in our representative character. 
in both, hGnesti^ is the best policy. This may not be the politician's creed ; 
and, if not, I thank God I am no politician. The gentleman from North 
Carolina (Mr Bvnum) can see no reason for pressing this proposition, un- 
less it ia that "the party, with which he supposes me to act, are more accus- 
tomed to defeats than he is. Sir, it may be so. I vole for every measure 
which I consider constitutional, and beneficial to my country; otherwise 1 
Vote against it, and never stop to inquire whether the administration party, 
or the opposition, vote with me or against me. The idea of being in a mi- 
nority has for me no terrors. We may.be defeated by this overwhelming 
majority; but in contending against it, the fewer our numbers the greater 
the honor of the struggle. , . 

V In vindicating the claims of the South, on the very grounds it has assu- 
'med, I trust her representatives will be united. In an early period of the 
discussions on this subject, this was the view, as I understood it, of alniost 
;he whole Southern delegation; especially of that of my own State. My 
colleagues, three of whom now sit near me, were, for the most part, deci- 
dedly of xjpinion that we should insist upon a direct and unequivocal vote; 
a disclaimer of the power to do what the abolitionists demanded. In a speech 
delivered by one of them, (Mr. Garland,) much commended in the loyal 
prints of the day— and I do not mean to question its merits— I find thus pas- 
sage: " But, say gentlemen, why press the constitutional question now.-- 
I rei>ly, we press it from the most urgent and imperious necessity. It is due 
to our safety, to our quiet, that we press it. Every other form m whicH 
this question has been presented has failed to secure us against the repetition 
of these memorials and petitions. Nothing, it seems, short of a declaration 
on the part of Congress of their want of constitutional power, will restrain 
these fanatical crusaders from seeking the intervention of Congress in aid ol 
their diabolical schemes, and perpetually harassing the country. 

\^U. Garland rose and said, he not only had taken the ground, as stated 
by his colleague, but desired distinctly to repeat that he still adhered to it.] 

Mr. Robertson: I did not suspect my colleague of any intention to 
abandon it; nor will I believe there is one of them who has maintained it, 
that-can be seduced or driven from it. They are prepared, I trust, to meet 
all the consequences it may involve; to make a voluntary saci.hce, it neces- 
sary, of political prospects, of life itself, sooner than shrink from what they 
consider their duty to their country and its constitution 1 hey arc assigned 
to defend the pass which may lead to its destruction ^^^^'^.^'^"^'"S '*' X j 
less as it may .eem^-they ,ma.y maintain it; or should they fail, may yet afloM 
2 



10 

tiai^ for those whom ihey would protect, to prepare for a better defepce.- 
We are stationed on the ramparts of the constitution. Shall vye be mduced 
to march out of our safe entrenchments and meet the enemy in the open fieid. 
Sir if the commander-in-chief, on a memorable occasion, had committed this 
follV we should never have heard of the glorious victory of New Orleans. 
No; sir; never let us give up the strong hold of the constitution Let us 
not repose too much confidence in the jrood faith, or the justice of those who 
have power over our lives or our liberties. Those who trust too much to 
the mercy of men in power, may possibly realize the fate of the unfortunate 
Texians who fell at Goliad. They may surrender at discretion, and be ue- 
stroved in detail— nurdered by division.s. For myself, if I stood alone, 
never but with life, would I yield up the citadel of our rights. If the day 
shall come when it must fall, I am content to perish with it, 

^Mr. R. gave way, without concluding, for the orders of the day .J 

Tuesday, Mat 24. 

Mr. Robertson continued. . 

Mr Speaker- 1 have said more, than I had intended on the preliminary 
grounds justifying the submission of the resolution now under discussion. 
I come now directly to the question- involved in It. r i . «u 

In examining that question, I shall enter into no discussion of what the 
Venerable member from Massachusetts, (Mr. Adams,) tauntingly terms the 
sublime merits of slavery; which, however sir permit me to say, whatever 
they may be, are not perhaps greatly excelled by the suul.me merits of 

modern abolitionism. _ , i .• „r tu^ 

\or will 1 bestow a moment's attention upon the resolution of the 
Seiect Committee, denying the right of Congress to interfere with slavery 
in the States. I have never considered that question proper to be debated 
n this Hall. 1 voted against its reference, because such reference seemed 
to imply a doubt respecting rights held by a title, paramount to the au.hority 
4? Coiwess, and toJ firmly settled to receive any additional strength trom its 



^'^^ Pion beibre us. Mr. Speaker, is one that admits of h Ul pby o 
ihefancv; and rejects even, were it in my power to command U^em a 
rhetor cal ornaments. It is a dry question of constitutional law; and 
om sn.ti e however, all must' acknowledge its ntrinsic '".portance, 
IpTe calculated to attract the attention of any but gentlemen accustomed to 

^^^1 '^^T^ror. all that ha. been said, it is my nite, I f^a.-, to address 
an un vil nnuditory-one, perhaps, that has already prejudged the question. 
\ verV ne. imp?ession,^n^ can doubt, exists among -''• '^^l^^- l^''^.^ 
oVtl -No h thatL abolition of slavery is clearly w.th.n the constitut oi 1 
^owc^ of Con. rress. Nothing is more natural . Born or raised under m.t tu 
,^ n idvcr* to slaverv, and under which it has, in most cases, been long 
Ulshed*ev readily adopt the opini<.n, that it is lawful or every other 
Go!^ nm^nt to do theinme.' It is natural, sir, but not logical, that they should 
,\ U. is conclus'on without nicely examining into its grounds. Ufa h 

.vhat is still more d.mcult to encounter, with their prejudtcts. 1 he> have 



11 

probably, in few instances, ever thought to inquire whether Ihe provisions 
of the federal constitution, which bear upon this question, correspond with 
their own. Yet every candid man will admit, that that constitution is the test 
by which the proposition is to be tried. I have endeavored to examine into 
■this matter with some care, and think I may venture to say, that while there is, 
perhaps, not one of the Northern States, whose fundamental law may not be 
rbasonably construed to give the power of abolishing slavery to the respective 
Ic'J-islative bodies, they all of them, in this particular, vary essentially from 
that of the State of Virginia, and of the United States, under both of which 
such power is denied to exist. I do not entertain the vain hope of removing 
the impressions, or changing the opinion, of any gentleman on this floor. 
The powers of a Chatham or a Cicero, would in all probability work no such 
effect. But we may hope, from the interesting nature of tlie subject, that 
every "-entleman will examine, fully, into the reasons of his belief; renounce 
it if his own reflections prove to him that it rests upon Aiilacious principles; 
or, if otherwise, show us the substantial grounds upon which ii can be 
maintained. . 

The reasons, Mr. Speaker, why the institutions of the Northern States 
admit or require the interpretation I have mentioned, must occur at once to 
every one. In those States, during our revolutionary struggle, slaves were 
comparatively few, and the intention of abolishing slavery, if not actually 
carried into eflect, entertained in almost all. It would have been absurd, 
therefore, in framing their constitutions, to close the door to abolition, or 
throw any serious obstacle in its way. The reverse, however, u-as the case 
in the South; and there, it was reasonable to expect, that the fundamental law 
would be more guarded, in protecting what was a most important interest in 
a lar"-e proportion of the community. The fact, it is believed, will be found, 
in a great degree, to correspond with these views. 

Look, sir, to the constitution of New Hampshire. The clause which 
may be regarded as bearing upon this point, is a part of the 12th section of 
the bill of rights. It is in these words: 

" Every member of the community has a right to be protected by it in 
the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property; he is therefore bound to contri- 
bute his share in the expense of such protection, and to yield his personal 
service, when necessarv,or an equivalent; but no part of a man's properly 
shall be taken from him, onapplietl to public uses, without his own consent, 
or that of the representative body of the people." Provisions nearly, or 
precisely similar, are to befound in the bill o{v\g\\isoi Massachusetts, sec. 10; 
of Ddatvare, sec. 10; of Vermont, sec. 10. The constitution, moreover, 
of each of thess Slates confers ample power on its legislative body to pass all 
laws for the s^ooct and welfare of the commonwealth, not repugnant to the 
constitution itself. (Const. New Hampshire, const. Mass., art. 4; const. 
Vermont, sect. 2.) Taking these provisions together, it may be fairly con- 
tended, that there is full authority to take away private property, whether 
wanted for public use or otherivise, whenever, in the opinion of the Legis- 
lature, the measure would conduce to the ^'good and welfare'" of the com- 
monwealth. 

Rhode Island denvcd her institutions from King Charles the Second, of 
blessed memory, and still reposes under the protection of the royal chr;rter. 
That charter gave to tiie governor and company, authority to |)ass all laws, 
as to them might seem meet for the '-good and welfare" of the said com- 



15' 

pany, ^'C. so as such laws be not contrary and repugnant to the laws of 

England; and as slavery was an institution not recognized by the laws of 
England, whatever doubts may exist of the right to establish it in Rhode 
Island, none can possibly exist as to the right to abolish it. 

Co?inecticut, like Rhode Island, remained during our revolutionary 
struggle, under the regulations of a charter granted by Charles the Second. 
She never formed a constitution till the year 1S18. By a provision of her 
bill of rights adopted in 1784, sec. 2, it was declared that " no man's goods 
t\\ou\\\ he iii'ken unless cleai'ly warranted by law. ''^ All that was necessary 
to justify the taking of them, was to pass a law to that effect; and the royal 
charter gave full authority to pass all laws not contrary to the laws of England. 
An act accordingly for its gradual abolition was passed in 1784, and it ceased, 
probably, to exist before the adoption of the new constitution. 
• In Neio York, the old constitution of 1777 gave, if possible, still greater 
latitude. It vested the supreme legislative power in two bodies; it con- 
tained no direct provision, as far as I have seen, protecting private property 
from seizure, except what is coiitained in the 13th section, which declares 
"that no member of this State shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of 
the rights or privileges ^cct^rerf to the subjects of this State, by this constitu- 
iion, UNLESS by the law of the land^ or the judgment of his peers." Thus., 
then, in New York, not only was the right of the citizen in his property 
not secured by any constitutional provision, but even if it was, it might at. 
any time be wrested from him, by any '< law of the land," passed by the 
supreme \e^\s\o^\.\\Q]}o\veT: supreme, indeed, since it might abrogate the cou- 
slitution itself. 

Nor do I find in the constitution of New Jersey any recognition of the 
inviolability of private property. The Legislature is clothed with power 
simply "to pass laws." The common law of England is declared to be in 
force: and it follows, consequently, that the Legislature might, (as the om- 
nipotent Parliament of Great Britain might,) under the common law, and 
in the abscence of any restrictive clause, exercise the power of abolishing 
slavery. 

Pennsylvania, it is known, passed a law abolishing slavery as early as 
1780. I have already shown that the right to do so existed under similar 
provisions to those which existed in the institutions of New Hampshire, and 
other Northern and Eastern States. 

It would be tedious, and unnecessary to the purpose of my argument, to 
enumerate in detail, the various provisions in the constitutions of those States 
where slavery still exists. It is enough to .«ay, in general, that Maryland, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee, in reference to the securi- 
ty of private rights, adopted, with perhaps slight modifications, the provisions 
of the 29th ch. of Magna Charta. [9 Hen. HI.] 

One example taken from the bill of rights of Tennessee, (art. 8.) may 
suffice for all. It is in these words: " That no freeman shall be taken, or im- 
prisoned, or disseized of his freehold or privileges, or ouilawed, or exiled. 
or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of life, liberty, or property, but 
by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land." 

The constitution of Kentucky, contains a special provision on the subject 
of emancipation. It declares that "The General Assembly ^hall have no 
power to pass laws for the emancipation of slaves without the consent of 



13- 

iheir owners, or without paying their owners> previous to such emancipation, 
a full equivalent in money for the slaves so emancipated." 

Virginia, in her bill of rights, inserted the provisions of the 29th chapter 
of Magna Charta, and in regard to private property, adopted a provision 
varying from those in the other States and closely resembling that in the 
Constitution of the United Stales. In the sixth article, the language is this: 
"All men having sufficient evidence of permanent common interest with, 
and attachment to the community, have the right of suffrage, and cannot be 
taxed or deprived of their property for public uses without their own con- 
sent, or that of their representatives so elected." 

But whatever opinions, Mr. Speaker, we may form, from the peculiar struc- 
ture of the different State constitutions or from general reasoning, as to the 
legislative power of abolishing slavery, when we look to the constitution of 
the United Slates, to which alone we must refer to ascertain the extent of 
our authority, we shall find little room for doubt or difficulty. , 

The fifth article of the amendments to the Federal Constitution is in these 
words: '< Nor shall private property be takenyir public use without just com- 
pensation." 

What is the just interpretation of this provision? Is it not obviously this? 
Private property may be taken for public use: and wh°n so taken, must 
be paid for. This construction is, indeed, expressly maintained in the 
report of the Select Committee. " The true meaning (says the report, p. 15) 
oi this provision obviously is, that private property shall be taken only fov 
public use, but shall not betaken even then without adequate remuneration." 

It is impossible to deny this, without perverting the terms from their ordi* 
nary signification. To found a claim for taking private property, it must 
be wanted for the public use. No learned lawyer need be consulted to give 
the true meaning of this simple language. You can have it expounded 
without difficulty, by the plainest farmer or mechanic of the country. Can 
it be pretended, that those who framed the constitution, could be ignorant of 
the import of the terms they employed ? No attempt can be successfully 
made, to construe these terms as conferring a right on Congress, to seize 
upon private property, whenever they may suppose the public good, the 
general welfare, require it. No expression can be found justly warranting 
gp.jaold a proposition. The enlightened men who framed the provision, 
would never have consented to such a grant of power, which would, indeed, 
authorize the invasion of private property, at the raere will and discretion of 
Congress. They designed that it, should be held sacred and inviolable by^ 
the Government, unless it was necessary to appropriate it to the exigencies 
of the public. Wiien that was the case, and then only, could it be touched^. 
For example, is land wanted for an encampment? it may be lawfully occupied; 
slaves, servants, and horses, munitions of war, provisions, may be impressed, 
when the country requires them for its own uses or necessities: but for no 
other purpose. You cannot take the property of one man to bestow upon 
another; stiil less can you confiscate it under & pretext o( ihe general lue/fure: 
nor under an authority to use it, render it absolutely incapable, as property 
of any future lise whatever. Such would be the necessary consequence of 
abolition. In this view. Congress has no more right to effect it under the 
constitution, than to confiscate a merchant's goods, and throw them into the 
Potomac, or to waste and destroy his lands, or turn them out as a common. 



14 

^.\An alternpt, however, has been made to call in aid that provi^iop of the 
constitution, which gives to Congress the right to exercise exclusive legis- 
lation over the District. Exclusive legislation for what? For all purposes? 
No, sir. For ail lawful and constitutional purposes: for no others. You cannot 
break over the limits of the constitution within the District, more than .in the 
States. The claims of our citizens to its protection, are not forfeited within 
the magic circle of the ten miles square. Can Congress establish a national 
church in the District of Columbia? put down the press? suppress the liberty 
of speech? or take away the trial by jury? No man will assert tliis, yet these 
infractions of the rights of the citizen are prohibited by no higher authority 
than that which forbids the Government from laying its hands upon private 
property, unless for the use of the public. 

If under tiiis clause you can abolisii slavery in the District, it is becausii 
you interpret the words public use, as of the same import with public 
good and general ivelfare. The docirine of the general welfare breaks down 
all limitations of power. Where, sir, would this construction stop? The 
clause in question was not designed solely for the protection of this District. 
If, by this forced construction, Congress can seize upon the slaves of the 
District, what is to pievent it from stretching its arm across the ten rniie^ 
square, and seizing upon those in the Slates? If you may confiscate that pro- 
perty in the District upon the plea of the general welfare, constitutionally, may 
you not, with still greater propriety, use that pov/er to remove the supposed 
evil existing in the State, on so much more extensive a scale ? The inference 
cannot be resisted. Human ingenuity cannot assign a solid reason for ex- 
pounding the clause in question, so as io protect the citizens of the States, 
and yet to leave those of the District exjwsed. I call upon gentle aien to 
show, if they can, any solid reason for the distinction. There is none. 
Wherever a citizen of the United States may be, within the limits of 
the Union, the constitution throws its mantle aromid him. If}ou may 
trample upon his privileges here, you may trample upon them every where: 
if you may seize upon one, you may. seize upon all; and there is no barrier 
against the absolute power of the Federal Government. 

[The House proceeded to the orders of the day.] 

Wednesday, May 24th. 

It is with unfeigned reluctance, Mr. Speaker, that I throw myself once 
more upon the i;i(Tuigcncc of the House. I trust to their kindness to make 
allowances for the frequent interruptions to which I have been subjected, 
during the brief hour allotted to the consideration of the question before us, 
by the pressure of other important business. I will hasten, sir, to a close, as 
speedily as possible, that I may relieve the House from what, I fear, so far 
as I am concerned, must be a dry and uninteresting discussion; and yield 
the floor to gentlemen, every way better entitlci to its attention. Permit 
me, sir, biielly to connect the broken thread of my argument. 

The jjositions uhich I have endeavored to establish, are : 

That under a reasonable interpretation of the fundamental institutions of 
all those States, in which slavery has been abolished, private properly may 
he taken, at the discretion of the Legislature, for any purpose ichnttver, 
deemed conducive to the public welfare. 

That under the constitution of the United States, on the contrary, pri- 



15 

yate 'pro|)6rty can be taken Jor no other purpose than for the use of the 
pti'blic. ' ""' ' . . ^ ■ 

The'claijse referred' to, '<Nor sftatl pnvafc property be taken for public 
\ise without just conipensalina." admits, as I iiave already shown, of no other 
reasonable construction. To say that it was designed solely lo award com- 
pensation, where private property was wanted Jor public use, but never- 
theless lo leave, or confer, full power to take it when not so wanted, would 
be manifestly absurd; it would be to hold, tliat the public must pd}/ for all 
property which their neceissiiies require; but thai they may confiscate it, at 
will, when they have no occasion for it, without making any compensation 
•vvhatever. But again: if it was intended that Congress might take private 
property at its discretion, whether wanted for public use, or not, then the 
expression, ''for public use," was wholly improper and superfluous. For 
the clause immediately preceding had already declared, that no person 
should <'6e deprived q{ life, liberty, or property, ivithout due process of 
law:'' and if it Avas not intended to restrain the generality of this last ex- 
pression, b}' limiting theseizure of private property to the case of public 
necessity, but simply to provide for compensation, the supposed intent 
would have been effected, by connecting with the clause just read, the pro- 
vision relative to compensation^ and omitting the words ^for public use,^' 
fo carefully inserted. These words; therefore, could have been inserted 
vvith no other view, than to limit and define the object or purpose, for 
which private property might be lawfully taken. The framers of the con- 
stitution v.-ere desirous of guarding it, in every way, against the capricious 
invasion of the Government. They hedged it around with numerous pro- 
yisioRs. Not satisfied with declaring that it should not be taken without 
due process of law, they withheld, in terms so plain that those who run may 
read, all authority to touch it, unless when W3,ni(^(i for p^iblic use; and even 
then, ivilhout just compensation. 

The gentlem.an from Massachusetts, who sits immediately before me, 
(Mr. Hoar,) when giving us his views on a former occasion, made a remark 
wjiich ought not to pass unnoticed. If slavery, said the gentleman, can- 
not be abolished in this District, without violating the principle tohich 
prohibits Government from taking private properly for public use with- 
out compensation, slavery here must remain undisturbed. Admitting 
the consequence to be as supposed, how does that settle the question of 
power? The gentleman has not informed us. But this mode of reasoning has 
been resorted to by others. The power, say they, must exist somewhere: 
it does not belong to the people of the District; for they have no political 
■power whatever: it cannot be exercised by the Siat«s, or either of them; 
because the constitution places the District under the exclusive legislation of 
Congress; if, therefore, it docs not belong to Congress, it exists no where. 
The premises may be true, and yet ihe conclusion is erroneous. It may be 
safely admitted that the power in question cannot be exercised by the people 
of the District, nor by the States; and yet it is clear, that it is not only not 
^iven, but plainly prohibited to Congress. VVhere then, it may be asked, 
does it exist.-* Sir, it exists?, like the power to abolish jury trials, io restrain 
the freedom of conscience, of .speech, or of the press, with tliosc wlio have a 
right to prescribe limits to all governments: it remaitis in the people, the 
great reservoir from whence ail power flows. I protest ag.iinst the.doclrine 



which would make Congress the residuary legatee of all undelegated powers. 
If the one in question, or any other not conferred, be deemed essential fijr' 
the public gooci, it can only be obtained by an amendment of the constitution. 

The gentlem.an from Massachusetts laid great stress upon that section of 
the constitution, which gives Congress exclusive legislation over this Dis- 
trict. He too seemed to consider the terms ^'exclunve legislation" as 
synonimous with absolute power. I have already shown that this pretension 
cannot be maintained; that the moment it is asserted, the constitution itself 
repels it. If it be true, then the liberty of speech, or of the press, may be 
invaded, the trial by jury abolished 

Mr. Hoar said the gentleman from Virginia was mistaken in supposing 
him to contend that the terms exclusive legislation conferred absolute power. 

Mr, Robertson. I could not suppose the gentleman would assert a pro- 
position so indefensible. It is one that cannot be maintained; without 
stripping the people of the District, nay every citizen who may enter its 
bounds, of all constitutional protection. 

But though the gentleman from Massachusetts admits this, he attempts to 
connect the clause giving exclusive legislative power over the District, with 
what he supposes to have been (he intention of the parties, so as to make 
good the power in Congress to abolish slavery within its limits. The rule 
of construction upon which he relies, that the intention of the parties 
ought to pret'ail, cannot he denied: but there is another rule which must 
not be overlooked — that where the language is plain and unambiguous, you 
are not at liberty to go out of the instrument in search of the intention. 
Here there is no ambiguity. The language, it is true, gives exclusive legis- 
lation: but that legislation cannot, as all admit, transcend the restrictions 
imposed by the constitution: and one of those restrictions secures private 
property from seizure, or confiscation, unless when required for the use of 
the Government. 

But if we may desert the instrument itself, to seek elsewhere for the 
intention of the parties, I insist that it is demonstrable, they never oould 
have ijUeuded what the gentleman from Massachusetts supposes. Observe, 
sir; the clause to be interpreted, is that giving exclusive legislation to 
Congress over the District of Columbia. But the same clause, in the same 
terms, gives exclusive legislation overall places purchased fsr forts, arsenals, 
magazines, and other public buildings. Now, sir, let us read it as inteipreted 
by the gentleman from Massachusetts: Congress shall have power to 
abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and in all places purchased 
for forts, arsenals, magazines, and other public buildings. This is the 
reading his interpretation requires. If it be the true reading, (hen is the 
proposition boldly asserted, (hat Congress has the power to abotisfi slavert/, 
not in this District merely, but in tlie States. Not the District only, but 
fyey^;v/ace purchased for the use of the United States, may be converted 
mto a sanctuary for fugitive slaves, who may be declared entitled to freedom 
tljo moment they enter it. Every fort may thus become a strong hold of 
abolitionism; every magazine, a magazine of mischief, from whence the 
fcncmi<;;> of our peace may hurl their firebrands and bombshells among us. 

These are the consequences of the j)Osition that Congress has power, under 
the clause in question, to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia. The 
same reasoning that would cstablisl) such a power over the Di.?trict, equally 



If 

maintains it within the limits of the States; yes, in the very heart of every 
State of the Union. I, sir, claim the benefit of the rule laid down by the 
gentleman from Massachusetts. I ask him; I appeal to every reasonable and 
candid man, whether such an interpretation is not wholly irreconcileable 
with the intentions of those who framed the constitution? Whether they 
do not know, that had such a provision been inserted in that instrument at 
the time, or such an interpretation anticipated, there Is not a single Southern 
State that would have ever entered into the LFnion? 

Once concede to Congress the constitutional power to abolish slavery, 
here or elsewjiere, and all that remains for the abolitionists to do, is to show 
that it is expedient to exercise it. They are to prove this to those who 
assert the power, and who come from States which have already shown their 
belief of the expediency of exercising it within their own limits. 

But, the committee say, it would be a breach of faith! Sir, the answer will 
be, there can be no breach of faith, where no promise has been exacted; no 
pledges ^iven. If the power was granted, it was granted like all others, 
that it might be exercised, whenever it should be thought expedient by those 
entrusted with it. Appeals to honor and good faith were not sufficient to 
prevent the strenuous efforts to enforce the unconstitutional Missouri re- 
striction. No, sir, if we yield this power, the day is not far distant when it 
will be exerted. And what then will be our condition? If we resist it, instead 
of a rightful resistance of usurpation, we shall be regarded, upon our own con- 
cession, as in rebellion to constitutional power; our resistance will therefore 
be denounced as unlawful. We shall be put under the ban of an ultra federal 
proclamation, and subjected, by a democratic republican majority, to the 
tender mercies of a force bill. Sir, the South never can consent: x\evti ought 
to consent, to occupy this position. 

Mr. Speaker, the doctrine contended for by the Southern States is not, 
as seems to be supposed, asserted now for the first time. If it has not been 
often urged, it is because no serious apprehensions were entertained, until of 
late, of attempts to interfere with their rights. But gentlemen seem to have 
forgotten that it was maintained in this very Hall on a former occasion. In 
the session of 1828-9, memorials praying for abolition in the District, wer« 
referred to a Select Committee, of which Mr. Alexander, of Virginia, was the 
chairman, and he made a report directly controverting the power of Con- 
gress upon constitutional principles. 

Upon what grounds, sir, give me leave to ask, can Congress »how a valid 
title to such a power? 

It is no where expressly granted. 

It is not essential to the due execution of any granted poWer. 

It cannot be assumed, upon the pretext that slavery may otherwise be 
perpetual; or that abolition would conduce to the general welfare. 

It is not conferred by the clause giving Congress exclusive legislation ov»r 
the District of Columbia. 

So far from being in conformity with the expressed or implied intention 
of the parties, it is absolutely incompatible with such intention. 

It is interdicted by the provision that forbids the taking of private proper- 
ty, unless when the public themselves have occasion to use it. 

Nor are these the only grounds, Mr. Speaker, that disprove the exiatenco 
of the power in question. There is still another clause of the constitution 
3 



which appears to me equally to forbid it: still another defence thrown around 
the rights of the people. The Ath article of the amendments of the con- 
stitution declares that, 

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per- 
sons or things to be seized.'' 

This clause, we are bound to suppose, meant something. The expression 
"unreasonable searches and seizures" is certainly a vague one: but it 
necessarily admits of construction. It is not more vague than the subsequent 
provision, that excessive bail shall not be required. It may be difficult to 
define what is excessive bail. Yet if a law should authorize bail to be de- 
manded for a debt often dollars, in a penalty of S10,000, no judge or legis- 
lator would hesitate to say, such bail was excessive, and its requisition uncon- 
stitutional. The constitution thus gives a practical security. Now, sir, I 
proceed to show that the power contended for cannot be exercised without 
a palpable violation of the article which prohibits inireasonable searches and 
eeiztires. In doing this, I shall invoke the aid of the Select Committee. 
All that is necessary, is to concede that the propositions are true which they 
have maintained — and maintained, 1 trust to the satisfaction of all — that the 
mbolition of slavery in the District ivoiildbea breach of faith, ttmvise, im- 
politic, and dangerous to the Union. The abolition of slavery, without 
the consent of the owner, necessarily implies his dispossession; — a forcible 
seizure of his property. Can a seizure then, I would ask, be deemed a 
reasonable seizure, which violates good faith, is u7iioise, — unwise, sir, — im- 
politic, and dangerous to the U^iion? 

To hold one to bail in a penalty, 50 or 100 fold the amount of the debt, 
would be to demand excessive bail, and therefore unconstitutional: to seize 
a large amount of property tosatisfy a triflngdebt, would, it must be admitted, 
be unreasonable; and therefore unconstitutional. But to seize his whole estate, 
without any charge of crime or debt, wnofer circumstances of such outra- 
geous injustice and folly, as to threaten the very dissolution of the Govern- 
ment itself, is no violation of the provision which prohibits •unreasonable 
seizures. It is reasonable then to violate good faith, common sense, and 
common justice, and to subvert the Union! 

It may be said, the clause in question applies only to seizures hy color of 
legal process. Be it so; but dispossession under a law abolishing slavery, 
would be a seizure under legal process — under authority or color of law. If 
it be not, then though this clause of the constitution would not apply, there 
is another that would; that already cited, declaring that property shall not 
be taken without due process of lau\ If the seizure be, therefore, by 
due process of law, it is tinrcasonable, because unwise and unjust, and 
therefore unconstitutional; and if without such process, it is equally uncon- 
stitutional, since all seizures arc prohibited loilhout due process of law. 
Unless this construction of the clause ir. question be adoj)ted, it atfords no 
security for the rights it professes to protect. Congress is supreme, despotic: 
and the property of the citizen may be confiscated, and his body imprisoned, 
»t its will and pleasure. 

This view must have presented itself to the committee: it lay directly in 



19 

their path; but they shunned it as though it had been an adder. The ele- 
mentary principles were before them which demonstrated the unconslitu- 
tionality of the proposed interference of the abolitionists; but they evaded 
the conclusion. The route prescribed to them led directly to the door of 
truth: they refused to enter. They were sent forth to battle for the rights 
of the people, armed with the iegis of the constitution: they gave it up for 
the frail paper shield of morality. They threw away the sword, and fought 
with the scabbard. 

It is much to be regretted, Mr, Speaker, that the Select Committe should 
have been influenced, by any considerations, to place the great question con- 
fided to their examination, eorc/w.vave/y upon the grounds they have taken, 
instead of that contended for by the South. In exploring the coast, to find 
some safe landing place for our rights, they might have rested them upon the 
firm ground of the constitution: it was full in their view: they circumnavi- 
gated it without even attempting to land. But in their homeward voyage 
they touched, it seems, at Albany — a place famous, it is said, for coining 
new fangied doctrines — and have brought us a cargo of Albany notions: 
among them this notion of relying on speculative oj)inions of morality, not 
in aid merely, but in place of the plain provisions of a written law or com- 
pact. To show you, sir, that this notion had its birth in Albany — for one I 
could have rejoiced, had it been suffered to die, and be buried, on the 
spot where it was born — I refer you, sir, to a celebrated letter of one of the 
candidates for the presidency. I allude to the letter of Mr. Van Buren, 
to certain gentlemen in North Carolina: a letter, I will take occasion to say, 
characterised throughout by artful and disingenuous evasions. 

Mr. Adams enquired if the gentleman from Virginia had the letter: he 
wished it read. 

Mr. Robertson replied, that he had not intended to fatigue the House 
with reading the letter: it was a very long one. His chief object in adverting 
to it, was to show the coincidence between the doctrines of Mr. Van Buren 
and the Albany meeting, and those maintained in the report of the Select 
Committee: but he had no objection to the reading, if any gentleman desired it. 

Mr. Adams said he was exceedingly anxious to have that part read, con- 
sidered by the gentleman from Virginia as evasive. 

Mr. Robertson requested the clerk to read the following passngc; 

'*These views, thus expressed and sanctioned by myself, appear to me to 
coverthe whole ground, save the abstract question, to which you have been 
pleased to call nxy attention, and I cheerfully embrace the opportunUy you 
have felt it your duty to afford me, to explain myself fully on that also. As 
anxious as you can possibly be, to arrest all agitation upon this disturbing 
subject, I have considered the question you have propounded to me, with a 
sincere desire to arrive at the conclusion that the subject, in respect to the 
District of Columbia, can be saiely placed on the same ground on which it 
stands in regard totheStates, viz: thewant of constitutional power in Congress 
to interfere in the matter. I owe it, however, to candor, to say to you, that 
I have not been able to satisfy myself that the grant to Congress, in the con- 
stitution, of the power of " exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever^' 
over the Federal District, does not confer on that body the same authority 
over the subject that would otherwise have been possessed by the States of 
Maryland and Virginia; or that Congress might not, in virtue thereof, take 



20 

such steps upon the subject in this District; as those States might themselves 
take within their own limits, and consistently with their rights of sovereignty. 

"Thus viewing the matter, I would- not, from the lights now before me, 
feel myself safe in pronouncing that Congress does not possess the power of 
interfering with or abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia. But, 
whilst such are my present impressions upon the abstract question of the 
legal power of Congress — impressions which 1 shall at all times be not 
only ready, but disposed, to surrender upon conviction of error — I do not 
hesitate to give it to you as my deliberate and well-considered opinion, that 
there are objections to the exercise of this power, against the wishes of the 
slaveholding States, as imperative in their nature and obligations, in 
regulating the conduct of public men, as the most palpable want of con- 
stitutional power would be.'^ 

Sir, this letter was obviously framed to suit all parties — all things to all 
men. To the North, it seems to concede the power; to the South, it protests 
against exercising it: and then, as if apprehensive of going too far, seeks to 
conciliate the good will of the Quakers. The question was a plain one: one 
that might have been answered in three lines; in two words, yes or no. Do 
you^ or do you not, believe in the const itutioyial power of Congress to abol- 
ish slavery in the fJistrlct of Columbia? How is it met? I repeat, sir, by a 
tissue of evasions. The question was put to him here, in Washington; down 
he dives, out of sight, and rises at Albany. He begins with exjiressing his 
great desire that his views should be thoroughly understood; and his inten- 
tion to disclose them in the fullest manner: but in tUe first place, as the sen- 
timents he has avowed for the last two years may not be known, he must 
communicate them, before answering the specific enquiry. Then follows 
an account of the Albany meeting, and the sentiments there expressed, in 
which he declares his full concurrence. Leaving Albany, on he moves dodg- 
ing and shuffling, until at length he approaches the point to which lie was 
bound. But does he approach it by a direct, manly, unequivocal course? Does 
he, sir, after ail, expre-is any decided opinion one way or the other? Mark his 
language. He owes it to candor to say that he has not been able to satisfy 
himself, that the grant of the power of exclusive legislation, does not confer 
the power of abolishing slavery in the District. But is he satisfied that it c/oe.v? 
Thus vietoing the subject he would not feel himself sa/e — I believe it, sir; 
he did not feel himself sajc: he was looking I fear, sir, more to his own 
safety than to that of the Soutli: — he would not feel himself safe in pro- 
nouncing, — that Congress does not possess the powtr. But does he 
feel himself safe in pronouncing that Congress dues possess the power/ 
No, sir; he speaks of his impressions; his present impressions upon 
the abstract question; impressions which he is ready, and disposed to 
surrender, upon conviction of error. I should hope these slight impressions, 
which he is so willing to renounce, have yielded to a more deliberate exami- 
nation. They do not deserve the name of opinions. Sup[)Osc, sir, by way 
of illustration, ihe question were propounded to me, whether certain i^eiule- 
men in this House, in my oj)inion, were or weie not abolitionists? and I 
tihould reply, J owe it to candor to say, that I have not been aide to sa- 
tisfy myself that the gentlemen in question are not abolitionists — would 
the gentleman from Massachusetts understand me to affirm that they are ? 
And if I should add, I do not, from the lights now before vie, feel myself 



2i 

iufe in pronounolng that they arc not abolitionists — would he undertake 
to say that I expressed a decided opinion the one way or the other ? 

But it was with no view, Mr. Speaker, of commenting at large, upon the 
equivocating language of this letter, that I thought proper to advert to it. 
It was principally with the view of pointing the attention of the House, to 
the doctrine it inculcates, that moral obligations are equally imperative irk 
regulating the conduct of public men, as the prohibitions of the constitu- 
tion itself; and more especially to point out the coincidence between this 
Albany doctrine, and that of the report of the Select Committee. In carrying 
out this doctrine, as I have already shown, the committee have even gone fur- 
ther than its original authors, by asserting the superior efficacy of moral, over 
legal restrictions. Sir, I regret to see the attempt in that report, to maintain 
a doctrine like this; an attempt to reconcile us to a surrender of power on 
the faith that it will not be exercised to our injury: to substitute the notions 
of justice, wisdom, or policy, entertained by moralists and politicians, as a 
sufficient restraint upon men in power, in lieu of the fixed and permanent 
landmarks of a written law. 

Nor, is this the only novel doctrine we have heard up6n this occasion. 
Not only is this moral obligation a better security, but it is even dangerous, 
it seems now, to rely at all on our constitutional rights. Sir, it is more dan- 
gerous to surrender them. If the temple of our liberty is indeed in so totter- 
ing a condition, that we dare not enter it, it is time to repair it, or look out for 
better shelter. But where is the danger.'' Are we to be told — and that by 
democratic republicans — that it is dangerous the people should know, what 
they know, and what greatly concerns their safety? Are the people, like 
children passing a church yard, to shut their eyes for fear of seeing ghosts? 
The abolitionists, it seems, will be encouraged, if they discover that a 
majority of this House is with them on the question of power: yet gentlemen 
tell them it is morally certain that the fact is so, and object to bring the ques- 
tion to a vote, on the ground of our inevitable defeat. Sir, the abolitionists 
are awake: they know all that we know, and probably much more: and I 
am unwilling that the people should not be as well informed, as their ene- 
mies, of the extent of the danger. We should not consent that they shall 
be hoodwinked, and bound hand and foot, while we unmuzzle the ilogs that 
worry them. 

There is one other constitutional objection, Mr. Speaker, to the power 
claimed for Congress of abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia, which 
it would not be proper to omit: — that to be deduced from a just view of the 
power of appropriation. It is important to recur, occasionally, to funda- 
mental principles: to the doctrines and opinions entertained at an earlier 
period of our history, by the sages who were called on to frame, or expound, 
the institutions under which we live. On a question like this, the opinions 
of none are entitled to greater weight, than those of the venerable Madison. 
According to the creed of the old federal party, the power of appropiation 
had no other limit than the general welfare: or in other words, the discretion 
of Congress. But this was not the (idctrine of the republicans of 179S. 
They insisted that public money could not be constitutionally expended, to 
effect any objects, except such as were expressly enumerated in the constitu- 
tion. This was the principle maintained in Mr. Madison's celebrated Re- 
port of 1799, on the alien and sedition laws. That report has been regarded 



22 

as the text book of State right politicians; the standard of republican ortho- 
doxy. I request that the clerk may read a passage from the argument upon 
this question, in which the import of the terms general ivelfare is com- 
mented upon. 

The Clerk read the following passage: 

'<The true and fair construction of this expression, both in the original 
and existing federal compacts, appear to the committee too obvious to be 
mistaken. In both, is subjoined to this authority an enumeration of the 
cases to which their powers shall extend. Money cannot be applied to the 
general welfare, otherwise than by an application of it to some particular 
measure conducive to the public welfare. Whenever, therefore, money has 
been raised by the general authority, and is to be applied to a particular 
measure, a question arises, whether the particular measure be within the 
enumerated authorities vested in Congress. If it be, the money requisite 
for it may be applied to it: if it be not, no such application can be made. 
This fair and obvious interpretation coincides with and is enforced by the 
clause in the constitution, which declares that "no money shall be drawn 
from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations by law.'' An ap- 
propriation of money to the general welfare would be deemed rather a 
mockery than an observance of this constitutional objection." 

'^Whether the exposition of the phrase here combatted, would not by 
degrefes consolidate the States into one sovereignty is a question concerning 
which the committee can perceive little room for diflerence of opinion. To 
consolidate the States into one sovereignty, nothing more can be xoanted 
than to supersede their respective sovereignties in the cases reserved to 
them, by extending the sovereignty of the United States to all cases of the 
general welfare, that is to say, to all cases whatsoever.^'' 

Yes, sir, such a power would indeed lead to consolidation. Give the 
power to Congress of unlimited appropriation; give them wiiJi it, what they 
now have, a treasury overflowing with millions beyond what the public ne- 
cessities require, and an unprincipled party will not scruple to use the pub- 
lic treasure to perpetuate, by every scheme that can be devised, its own 
power and influence. The people, the source of all power, will be corrupt- 
ed by their own money; and what should be the life-blood of our system, 
will be converted into its poison. 

But I proceed to apply the principles maintained by Mr. Madison, in 
this unanswered and unanswerable report. 

The enactment of a law abolishing slavery, necessarily stipposes an ap- 
propriation of money, to pay for the emancipated slaves. No one on this 
floor, has ever yet asserted the principle, that such abolition can be effected, 
against the consent of the owner, without adequate compensation. Such an 
act would be simply an act of sheer rol)bery. But the abolition of slavery, 
or the purchase of slaves, with a view to emancipation, are not, as all will 
agree, among the objects expressly enumerated in the constitution. Neither 
are they, in any way, essential to the attainment of any iipecified object; nor 
to the due execution of any specific power. If the power to appropriate 
money, draws to it the po\v(T to crcalf, or select, the objects o^ appropriation, 
and may be extended to embrace tlie abolition of slavery, it must be on the 
pretext assumed by the federal party, because such a measure is conducive 
to the general welfare. Where, air, will this doctrine lead us? If we may 



23 

apply the public treasure, upon this ground, to pay for this properly when 
taken from the owner against his consent, surely we may compensate him for 
it when freely surrendered by sale or contract. If by virtue of the power 
to appropriate, we uiay confiscate, or purchase slaves in the District, so may 
we, under the same authority, purcha>«e or confiscate them in the States. 
Or say, that we are confined to the District: that we may open a market 
here and here only for the purchase of slaves, with a view to emancipation: 
then the District may become a great mart for slaves, and the treasury ex- 
hausted in purchasing them, brought in, as they would be, from all the slave- 
holding States. Whether the power of appropriation imply or confer the 
power of abolition, or not, there is no doubt that abolition or emancipation, 
necessarily supposes and authorizes appropriation. If slaves be purchased, 
or taken against the owner's consent, they must be paid for. Now I inquire 
of the State-right politicians, the democratic republican majority of this 
House, if they are prepared to assert this doctrine? Have we not heard from 
them, heavy denunciations of one of the candidates for the presidency, for 
having as it is said, expressed the opinion, that public money may be lawfully 
applied for the liberation of slaves, in aid of the Colonization Society? And 
will they now, by affirming the constitutionality of abolishing slavery, and 
the consequent appropriation of money to that object, assert the very doctrine 
they have condemned? 

If we can lawfully emancipate slaves, here or elsewhere, we must hare 
the power of determining what shall be done with them; of providing the 
means, if necessary, of removing them: and in that case there can be, surely, 
no impropriety in putting them under the care of the Colonization Society. 
I warn the party, that they cannot maintain the power it is supposed they 
are prepared to assert, without splitting upon the doctrine they profess so 
much to abhor. But if they will assert it, I trust we shall at least hear, from 
them, no more denunciations against others for defending the same 
principle. 

Let us trace a little farther, the consequences of this power. 

If you may confiscate .or purchase slaves, you may hold them. Has the 
House considered the consequences of authorizing the General Govern- 
ment to become a slaveholder? How will you dispose of them? Where 
will you place them? If you can confer the right to freedom, you may 
prescribe the conditions on which it shall be enjoyed; and if these be not 
complied with, re-convert them, as is done in some of the States, to slavery. 
You may make it a condition, that unless they depart from the District 
within a limited time, they shall forfeit their freedom. But suppose the 
States will not consent, that such a crew of ignorant and unprincipled pau- 
pers and vagabonds, shall be turned loose upon them. Have you the power 
to compel their admission? Will you attempt to enforce that power? or 
will you confine them within the bounds of the District? or give them up 
to the Colonization Society? When you shall have emancipated them, what 
sir, let me ask, is to be their condition? Are they to be regarded as citizens 
of the United States? I know of no means whereby the United States can 
acquire citizens, but two: by birth, or by naturalization: but emancipated 
slaves are neither citizens by birth, nor by naturalization. Will you then 
admit them to an equality of rights with the free citizens of the different 
States? make them eligible to all offices, civil and military; foreign emba*. 



24 - 

sies; the presidency itself? or are they to be freedmen, and not freemen? 
citizens without the privi!eg»^s of citizenship? But, perhaps, you will 
enlist them as soldiers! It must be confessed, better materials could not be 
found for a standing army. They might serve an admirable purpose too, 
to keep the South quiet; or the Capital may be s-urrot^nded by a chosen 
band of black Janissaries, and the day may come, when no man shall dare 
to rai?T his voice in this Hall, in defence of right against power. Are 
gentlemen prepared to assert a claim fraught with these monstrous, these 
momentous consequences? 1 trust not; for sir, I repeat, the people of the 
South can never admit it. They cannot consent to hold their property, 
their lives, and their liberty, at the mere discretion of a majority of 
Congress. They never will be, they never ought to be satisfied, until a 
power so dangerous to their rights, so fatal fo their peace, shall be solemnly 
^iy^jo,-.^.^^ i^y ♦<-■•; rv^y.^rnmenf: or if ? Hmibt exis^, the pretension for ever 
put to rest by a constitutional provioio.i, too plain to bu perverteu. 



LHO.p, i^^^ 



